EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
SUISCRIPTION PRICE, $2.60 A YEALR. SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS.
EDITORIAL BOARD.
JOHN F. BAKER, Chairtan.
FRANK KENNA, Graduate, FLAvEL ROBERTSON,
Business Manager. Secretary
JOSEPH A. ALLARD, JR., JAMES A. STEVENSON, JR.
HENRY C. CLARK, BUCKINGHAM P. MERRIMAN,
ALEXANDER W. CREEDON, C. FLOYDE GiPER,
CLEAVELAND J. RICE, THOMAS C. FLOOD,
LEONARD 0. RYAN, IRVING M. ENGEL,
Published monthly from November to June, by students of the Yale Law School.
P. 0. Address, Box 893, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of
his subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that 
a
oontinuation of the subscription is desired.
WHEN A PROMISORY NOTE EXECUTED ON SUNDAY IS VALID AS A
WORK OF CHARITY OR NECESSITY.
In a recent Georgia case the court held that where a person is in
the common jail of the county under a warrant charging a bail-
able offense, and in order to be released from imprisonment he
employed a lawyer to secure a bond for him, and was thereupon
released, a note given by the prisoner to the lawyer for his ser-
vices, including the services rendered in procuring the bond, was
valid and collectible although executed on Sunday, the considera-
tion being in the nature of a work of charity within the meaning
of the Sunday statute exception from its operation works of char-
ity or necessity. Few v. Gunter, 72 S. E. Rep., 720.
This case involves the questions of the lawfulness of procuring
bail on Sunday, as a work of charity or necessity, and the validity
of a contract or note executed in the undertaking of that work.
In People v. Johnson, 31 Ill., 469, it was held that the entering
into a recognizance, by one charged with a criminal offense, is
not such a judicial act as to render its execution void, either at
common law or by statute, because it was entered into on Sunday;
and that any work necessary to be done to secure the public safety,
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by the keeping of a felon, or delivering him to bail, comes within
the true exception of the statute. A recognizance entered into
on Sunday has also been held good by the Indiana court. State v.
Douglas, 69 Ind., 544. And the undertaking of an appeal bond,
-executed on Sunday, has been held valid in Nevada. State v. Cal.
Mlining Co., 13 Nev., 2o3. While in Texas a convict hiring bond
is held to be valid, although executed on Sunday. Ex parte
lVfillsap, 39 Tex. Cr. R., 193. But in State v. Suhur, 33 Me., 539,
it was held that a recognizance taken on the "Lord's Day," to
prosecute an appeal in a criminal cage, is unauthorized and void.
In Salter v. Smith, 55 Ga., 244, it was said that bail entered into
on Sunday came within the statutory exception of a work of
charity or necessity, and was valid. And this court further holds
in Weldon v. Colquitt, 62 Ga., 449, that it is lawful to take bond
on Sunday, admitting a prisoner to bail, the same being in favor
of liberty, and in the nature of a work of charity to a human
being in distress. The Louisiana court says that the prohibition
against the issuance of process on Sunday does not extend to
criminal cases, and that a prisoner may be bailed on Sunday. State
v. Wyatt, 6 La. An., 701. In Hammons v. State, 59 Ala., 164,
the court holds that an undertaking of bail, entered into on Sun-
,day, is sanctioned by the law and is perfectly valid; for it is a
work of necessity in the sense that it is an act morally fit and
-proper under the circumstances of the case. And in Watts v.
Com., 68 Ken. (5 Bush.), 309, it was held that a bail bond
executed on Sunday, for the appearance of a person accused of a
felon, is as much binding on the sureties as if it had been made
on any other day.
In Burns & Co. v. Moore, 75 Ala., 339, the Court says: "The
-necessity which will excuse, if not a physical one, must, at least,
-be a moral emergency which will not reasonably admit of delay,
'but is so pressing in its nature as to rescue the act done from the
'imputation of a wilful desecration of a day made sacred for cer-
'tain purposes in morals as well as in law." And that a con-
tract made on Sunday, if made in a case of necessity, is not void.
The case of Sheppey v. Eastwood, 9 Ala., 198, involves a note
made on Sunday where the maker was arrested on that day with
the charge of bastardy against him. The note was then executed
in discharge of the arrest and was given for the support of the
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supposed bastard child; but the Court held that the note was not
made in the execution of a work of necessity or charity 
anqd was
therefore void because made on Sunday. Still in Hooper 
v.
Edwards, iS Ala., 280, a bill of sale of a number of 
slaves, which
a debtor was endeavoring to spirit away, made by that absconding
debtor to his creditor, who overtook him on Sunday and 
forced
him to deliver the slaves over, was held to be valid and binding.
In Clap v. Smith, 16 Pick., 247 (Mass.), a debtor had 
made an
assignment for the benefit of his creditors, which recited 
that the
annexed schedule contained a list of the property, 
when in reality
the schedule was not so annexed at the time of the 
delivery of the
bill of assignment. However, it was annexed at a 
later date, but
on Sunday, and it was held that if the annexation of 
the schedule
of the property was necessary to complete the sale 
it was not a
void act although done on Sunday. But in Mace v. Putnam, 71
Me., 238, it was held that the making 
of a draft on Sunday, in
order that a man about to leave home may receive 
pay for labor
done, is not a work of necessity or charity so as to 
take the case
out of the statute.
Aldrich v. Blackstone, 128 Mass., 148, lays 
down the rule that
it is not unlawful for the overseers of the poor to 
make a contract
on Sunday for the relief of a sick pauper. 
And a contract for
hiring a horse on Sunday to take a prisoner to jail on legal 
process,
is a work of necessity and valid. Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich., 454.
Also the hiring of a horse and carriage on 
Sunday, by a son to
visit his father in the country, is a valid contract, 
as the law does,
not forbid the discharge of a filial duty. Logan 
v. Matthews, 6 Pa.,
42o. Nor is it unlawful for a husband 
and wife to contract for
a conveyance on Sunday to attend the funeral 
of the husband's
brother-in-law. Home v. Meakin, 115 Mass., 
326. It has also
been held that the employment of a physician, 
and a contract to
pay him for his services, made on Sunday, is 
not prohibited, as
healing the sick, or employment of a doctor to do 
so, is a work
that is required by necessity and charity. Smith v. Watson, 14 Vt.,
332; In re Stagger's Estate, 8 Pa. Super. Ct., 
260.
It is settled beyond doubt that the raising of a subscription 
from
a congregation on Sunday to pay off a church debt, 
or purchase
a house of worship, is a work of charity, and hence 
not unlawful;
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that therefore contracts and promises made on Sunday for donat-
ing such subscriptions are valid and enforcible. Allen v. Duffie,
43 Mich., I; Dale v. Knepp, 98 Pa., 389; Bryan v: Watson, 127
Ind., 42. But subscribing in aid of a railroad on Sunday is
unlawful. S. T. & R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 55 Mich., 19o. And
procuring and affixing signatures of taxpayers to a petition for
issuance of railroad aid bonds is unlawful. De Forth v. W. & Jl1.
R. Co., 52 Wis., 320. However, it seems to be well established
that a will is perfectly valid although executed on Sunday. Ben-
nett v. Brooks, 9 Allen (Mass.), 118; Breitemman's App., 5 Pa.,
183; George v. George, 47 N. H., 27; Rapp v. Rehling, 124 Ind.,
36.
At common law it was lawful to perform any act on Sunday
not expressly prohibited. Re.x. v. Brotherton, i Stra., 702; White
v. The Hundred of Stoke, Cro. Jac., 496. And in Beham v.
Ghio, 75 Tex., 87, it was said that contracts made on Sunday,
when not made in the course of a business prohibited upon that
day, are valid.
The trend of the English decisions, although not based upon
exactly the same line of reasoning, is very similar to that of the
American cases. The earlier English cases interpreted the statute,
prohibiting labor on Sunday, except works of charity or necessity,
as meaning that to be unlawful the act must be done in the ordi-
nary calling of the doer. For example, the private sale of a
horse, at the request of the owner, who was a baker, by one whose
business was to sell horses at public auction, was held lawful.
Drury v. De Fountaine, i Taunt., 131. But in a later case, Smith
v. Sparrow, 4 Bing., 88, Judge Park lays down the inflexible rule
that the expression, "any worldly labor," cannot be confined to a
man's ordinary calling, but applies to any business he may carry
on, whether it is his ordinary calling or not. And in William V.
Paul, 6 Bing., 653, the Court expressly condemns the construction
of the statute in Drury v. De Fountaine, supra.
In England a bail bond may be validly given on Sunday, and
bail may take their principal on Sunday, as well as any other day,
to surrender him in their discharge. Anonymous, Mod. Cas., 236
(6 Mod. Rep.). An undertaking by an attorney on Sunday to
become surety for his client was held not to be unlawful in Peate
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v. Dickens, 3 Dowl. R., 171. And in Norton v. Powell, 4 Man. &
G., 42, it was held that a guaranty may lawfully be given on Sun-
day by one tradesman to another for the faithful services of a
commercial traveler to be employed by the latter. In both of the
above cases, however, the Court seems to revert to the earlier con-
struction of the statute. In W4olton v. Gavin, 15 Jur., 329, it was
held that an army enlistment may be validly made on Sunday.
And in Stallard v. G. W. Ry. Co., 2 Best. & S., 419, the Court
holds that a railroad company may lawfully transact the ordinary
business of checking baggage on Sunday.
The foregoing decisions seem to show that it has been firmly
established that the procurement of bail by a person deprived of
his liberty, through confinement in a prison, may be lawfully done
on Sunday, as coming within the exception of an act of necessity
or charity; and that a note given in consideration of the accom-
plishment of that office of charity is perfectly valid and enforce-
able although made on Sunday.
THE EFFECT OF MARRIED WOMAN'S ACTS UPON THE HUSBAND'S
LIABIILTY FOR THE WIFE'S TORTS.
At common law the husband, as an inevitable incident of mar-
riage became responsible for the misconduct of the wife and
answerable in damages for her torts. In 2 Kent's Commentaries
149 the author, discussing the rights and liabilities which grow out
of the marital relation says, "the husband is liable for the torts of
the wife committed during coverture. If committed in his com-
pany or by his order, he alone is liable. If not, they are jointly
liable, and the wife must be joined in the suit with the husband.
The torts of the wife for which the husband could be held
liable at common law may be conveniently divided into four
classes. (I) Where the act is committed by the wife during the
husband's absence and without his knowledge. (2) Where the
husband, although absent, induced the wife to do the tortious act.
(3) Where the husband was present but the wife acted entirely of
her own accord. (4) Where the husband is present and the act
is done in his company and by his encouragement or persuasion.
It is to torts arising under subdivision (I) that this article is
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especially adapted, and it is interesting to observe how these com-
mon law principles have been dealt with in the different jurisdic-
tions since the enactment of the Married Woman's Property Act.
In a recent case, Poling v. Pickens, 73 S. E. (W. Va.), 251, it
was held that the husband was liable for slanderous words spoken
by the wife although he was absent at the time and notwithstand-
ing the fact that there was a married woman's property act in
that State.
Declaratory of the common law rule is an early English decis-
ion, Head v. Briscoe, 5 Carr. & Payne, 484, which holds in sub-
stance that when the wife commits a libel against a person, even
during the temporary or permanent absence of the husband, unless
such separation caused the legal relation of husband and wife to
cease, the husband shall be answerable for her tort. About fifty
years after this decision was rendered Parliament passed the Mar-
ried Woman's Property Act. In this act there was no express
provision relieving the husband from liability for his wife's torts,
and consequently in a later case it was held that husband and wife
were properly joined in an action where recovery was sought for
a tort committed by the wife. Seroka v. Kallenberg, 55 Law J.
(N. S.), Q. B. D., 375.
So in New York the common law rule making the husband
liable for the torts of the wife has not been abrogated by the
enactment of statutes allowing suits to be brought against married
women as if they were sole. Nor has such result been brought
about by statutes giving the wife absolute control of her property.
Fitzgerald v. Quann, io9 N. Y., 441. And Fowler v. Chichester,
26 Ohio State, 9, is in accord with the principal case in holding
that the statutes "concerning the rights and liabilities of married
women" have not changed the common law rule in regard to the
husband's liability for the wife's torts. And it further declares
that in an action against husband and wife for slanderous words
spoken by the wife exemplary damages may be allowed. But
the Tennessee court, recognizing the common law doctrine as
laid down in Fowler v. Chichester, supra, presents a modification
of the rule and declares that while the husband is liable under the
circumstances of that case he can only be held to answer for com-
pensatory damages. The reasoning of the Court upon which
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this modification is based proceeds upon the theory that since
exemplary damages are given for a flagrant wrong, the husband,
who was absent at the time and in no way participated in the mis-
conduct, should only be held to compensatory damages. And
similarly in Taylor v. Pullen, 152 Mo., 434, it was said with
respect to the married woman's act of that State, expressio inius
exclusio alterius," and accordingly where husband and wife were
joined for the wife's slanderous words the Court held the husband
liable. Upon the same principle North Carolina holds the hus-
band liable for words spoken by the wife during his absence and
without his knowledge or encouragement. Presnell v. Moor, 120'
N. C., 390.
Contrary to the doctrine of the principal case and the succeed-
ing line of authorities, many States refuse to place a strict con-
struction upon the Married Woman's Act, and consequently by
implication or a process of judicial legislation the following States
hold that statutes giving the wife absolute control of her property
necessarily exonerate the husband from liability for her torts.
Thus in Lane v. Bryant, lOO Ky., 138, the Court holds that since
the liability of the husband at common law for the torts of the
wife was based upon the idea that upon marriage he acquired con-
trol of her property, any legislative act which gives the wife con-
trol of her estate destroys the reason for the common law rule
and by implication relieves the husband from liability. There-
upon a judgment rendered against husband and wife for slander-
ous words spoken by her in his absence was reversed and
remanded. The Utah court in a similar case held that the inter-
vention of a statute giving the wife control of her property during
coverture removed the husband's liability for her torts. Culver v.
Wilson, 13 Utah, 129. In an almost evenly divided court it was
held in Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill., 132, that while the statute&
giving married women control of their property "do not expressly
repeal the common law rule that the husband is liable for the torts
of his wife, they have made such modifications of his rights and
her disabilities as wholly to remove the reason for the liability.'
So the husband was held not liable for the tort of the wife in
speaking slanderous words. And the Louisiana court removed
the husband's liability by implication under similar circumstances
when the wife uttered slanderous words without the knowledge
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-or participation of the husband. McClu.re v. McMarti, 1O4 La.,
496. The same doctrine is established in Kansas. See Norris v.
,Corkill, 32 Kans., 409.
To remove all possibility of doubt, to prevent continuous dis-
.sension among the judges of the respective courts, and to deter-
-mine once for all the law that should govern in the particular
jurisdiction, it has been found expedient to enact statutes in many
States relieving the husband by express language from liability
for the wife's torts. Alabama, Massachusetts, Indiana, and
:Michigan are among the States which have enacted express stat-
-utes upon the subject.
Upon a careful examination of the authorities there can be no
doubt that the decided weight of authority is in support of the
,common law rule making the husband liable for the torts of the
wife irrespective of the statute giving the wife absolute control of
her property. Where there is no express statute upon the subject
comparatively few States exonerate the husband from liability by
reading into the Married Woman's Act, contrary to the wording
,of the statute, language sufficient for that purpose.
'HE EFFECT UPON A PRIOR WILL OF THE REVOCATION OF A SECOND
WILL CONTAINING A REVOKING CLAUSE.
The authorities are in irreconcilable conflict as to the effect of
the destruction of a second will containing a revoking clause upon
a prior will, in the absence of any statutes.
In the recent case of Blackett v. Ziegler, 133 N. W. (Iowa),
-9O, the testatrix executed a will in 1895. She subsequently
made another will which contained a clause revoking the will of
1895. The later will was destroyed by the testatrix. The Court
-held that the destruction of a second will which expressly revoked
:a former will does not raise any presumption that the former will
-is thereby revived, but it is a question of the testator's intent, to
be gathered from admissible parol testimony.
This case follows the rule of, the ecclesiastical courts of
England, which is stated in the case of Helyar v. Helyar, I Lee
lEcc., 472. This rule is that the revival of a former uncancelled
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-will by the destruction of a subsequent revocatory will was purely
:a matter of the testator's intention.
This rule was never followed by the common law courts of
England, but it has been instrumental in molding the decisions
Tendered by a number of jurisdictions in this country, the leading
case being Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass., 252. The Court there
held that in the absence of any statutory provisions to the contrary
the proof of such an intention at the time of the cancellation of the
second will would give to the act of cancellation the effect of
-reviving the former will.
Under this rule there is no presumption either way, but it is to
-be determined solely according to facts and circumstances. Horton
-v. Head, 3 Phillim. Ecc., 26.
Some of the American decisions which have adopted the
-ecclesiastical rule have digressed somewhat from the doctrine
-stated in Horton v. Head, supra. The Court says in Pickens v.
Davis, supra: "It is more natural and reasonable to assume that
such revocatory clause shows emphatically and conclusively that
-he has abandoned his former intentions and substituted therefore a
new disposition of his property." Therefore it is held that in the
.absence of evidence as to the testator's intention the prior will
-will not be revived. Williams v. Miles, 94 Nev., 591.
The doctrine of the ecclesiastical courts is based on the
:assumption of actual destruction, for, as is stated in Daniel v.
Nockalds, 3 Hagg. Ecc., 777, an effort to revive a revoked will
'by oral declarations without destroying the later will would be
ineffectual.
The reason given by some of the American courts for adopting
-this doctrine in preference to the common law rule, infra, is that
the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over wills disposing of
-personalty, and from their decisions our law is derived in large
-part. At the same time they say this rule is the most reasonable
-that can be formulated. Williams v. Miles, 94 Nev., 591.
The common law rule was that the cancellation or destruction
-of the second will ipso facto revives the former will, irrespective
of the intention of the testator. This rule was based on the
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statement of Lord Mansfield in Goodright, Glazier v. Glazier,
4 Burr, 2512, which held that the destruction of the second wilL
containing a revocatory clause will cause the first will to operate-
as if the second will had never be~n executed. The last will exist-
ing is given effect as the "last will." The revoking clause is-
treated as purely testamentary in its character.
The theory upon which this rule is based has been stated to be-
that "all wills are ambulatory and have no operation until the-
testator's death, and the destruction animo revocandi by the testa--
tor of a second will will necessarily leave the first to go into opera--
tion at his death, nor does the fact that the second contains a
clause of revocation alter the case, because that clause is just as-
inactive as the rest of the will and so continues up to the time the-
whole will is cancelled." Stetson v. Stetson, 200 Ill., 594.
The rule laid down by Lord Mansfield is no longer of any force-
in England. It has been abrogated by the Statute of Wills, i
Vict., c. 26, s. 22, which provided that no will or codicil or any-
part thereof which shall be in any manner revoked, shall be-
revived other wise than by the re-execution thereof, or by a codicil'
executed as required by the act, and showing an intention to revive-
the same. The old English rule prior to the statute has still some-
force, however, in this country, as is shown by the case of Stetson-
v. Stetson, supra.
In addition to the rules stated, there is another line of cases.
which hold that the revocatory clause is not testamentary in its-
character, but that it operates to revoke the prior will immediately-
upon the execution of the second will.
The Court in In re Noon's Will, 115 Wis., 299, states: "Where-
the second will contains a revoking clause, all former wills are-
wiped out and held for naught. The operation of the revocatory-
clause is immediate and absolute. It is an act done solemnly and-
deliberately for present effect, and not one contemplating that
future circumstances are to determine whether it shall have-
force."
A deed of revocation separate from the will operates instan--
taneously, and the operation is the same, whether the revoking.
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clause be in a deed or will, for it is never a necessary part of the
latter. James v. Harvil, 3 Conn., 576.
This doctrine has been criticised by some of the text writers.
I Redfield on Wills, Sec. 328: "This doctrine has an air of plausi-
bility from the fact that an instrument of revocation alone would
unquestionably have this effect so long as it was allowed to remain
operative. But that would show a present purpose of becoming
intestate carried into effect as far as practicable before death. But
the making of a will with a ievocatory clause is very different.
It is but substituting one will for another, and the revocatory
clause is made dependent in some sense upon the subsequent will
going into operation, and there is ordinarily no purpose of having
the revocatory clause operate except upon that condition."
Much of the uncertainty existing in these cases has been
removed by legislation in a number of the States, some following
the English statute, supra. In those States, however, which have
no express statute regulating this matter, the greater number fol-
low the doctrine of the principal case, which is substantially the
old ecclesiastical rule, that the question as to whether or not the
earlier will is revived by the cancellation of the later will depends
upon the intention of the testator, and that in the absence of
affirmative evidence of such intent there will be no revival. The
common law doctrine as stated by Lord Mansfield is in the main
disapproved in this country, according to Schouler on Wills, Sec.
415.
REFRESHING MEMORY BY REFERENCE TO COPY OF REPORT 
PRINTED
IN A NEWSPAPER.
At times a witness is unable to recall facts clearly, at the time
when he is being examined. The question as what may be used
to refresh his memory then becomes important. That he may
use a memorandum made by himself at the time, provided it calls
up an independent recollection in his mind, is fully settled. But
many cases arise where although the witness made a memorandum
at the time, the original has since been lost, or is unavailable, and
only a copy can be produced.
Erdman v. State, 134 N. W. (Neb.), 258, presents such circum-
stances as those mentioned. The defendant was being tried- for
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attempted murder, and during the course of the trial a newspaper
reporter was called by the defense. After testifying that he was
present at the time of the examination of a certain suit case, he
was asked as to how many cartridges were in the pistol found in
the suit case. His answer was, in substance, that it was impos-
sible for him to remember the details of what he saw in making
that examination; that he wrote out what he had seen and fur-
nished it to the paper for publication; that his writing was
accurately published, but the original manuscript was not kept;
that he could refresh his memory from the published article and
testify to what he saw in the examination made; but that he could
not otherwise do so, having no present recollection of the matter
suggested by the inquiry. The lower court, upon objection,
refused to allow the evidence, holding that the witness could
refresh his memory only fronm the original memorandum. The
Supreme Court, however, held that this was error, and that the
evidence should have been allowed.
The opinion quoted from the case of Topham v. McGregor,
i Car. & Kir. (Eng.), 320, as a case representing both the English
and American rules. In that case the writer of articles in a
newspaper testified that all the articles written by him were true,
and it was held that the newspaper containing the article under
consideration might be placed in his hands for the purpose of
refreshing his memory ,and that he might be asked whether, look-
ing at the articles, he had any doubt that the fact was as therein
stated. To the same effect is Hawes v. State, 88 Ala., 37, which
was an indictment for murder. There, the witness being called
to prove a conversation which he had with the defendant at the
time of his arrest, testified that he was then acting as a reporter
for the Evening Chronicle; that he made notes of the conversa-
tion, and from them wrote out an account of what was said for
the paper; and that this account was published in the paper, after
being cut down, and some parts of it being omitted. It was shown
that the notes from which the article was written had been
destroyed. Upon this showing the witness was allowed to refer
to and read the article as published, to refresh his memory in
regard to what was said by the defendant at the time in question.
To this there was an exception, but the Court overruled it, saying,
"We do not think it is tenable. The article as published, was
written by the witness. It contained, the witness swears, the
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substance of what the defendant said. The question presented-
by the exception comes within the principle adjudged in the case
of Horne v. McKenzie, 6 Clark & Finnelly, 628, where a surveyor
was permitted to refresh his memory by reference to a printed.
copy of his report, which had been made out from his original.
notes, of which it was, in substance, though not in words, a tran-
script. The same principle is negatively asserted in New York,
where the Court held, that the memory of a witness could not be
refreshed by reference to an article which "did not purport to be,
and was not in truth, a statement of a conversation with, or
declaration made by the plaintiff, and which was therefore not
competent for the purpose in view. Downs v. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y.,
87."
Where a witness is testifying as to the testimony which a.
person gave on a former trial, he may refresh his memory from.
notes taken at the time ,or from a newspaper printed by him, con-
taining the evidence as taken down by him. U. S. v. Wood, Fed.
Cas. No. 16, 756 (3 Wash. C. C., 44o). Again, it has been held,.
that where the original manuscript of an alleged libelous article
published in a newspaper was lost, the reporter who wrote the
same from a verbal interview with the person sued might be shown
the article to refresh his memory. Clifford v. Drake, 110 Ill., 135.
Also, that a witness who is a newspaper reporter may be allowed,
for the purpose of refreshing his recollection of what was said at
a particular time, to look at a printed copy of his own printed
report of the proceedings at that time, although the absence of
the written report is not accounted for. Commonwealth v. Ford,
13o Mass., 64. Likewise, in Jackson v. State, 66 Miss., 89, a-
reporter was permitted to refresh his memory by reference to a-
newspaper, the Court saying: "The testimony of the witness was
properly admitted. As we understand the record, he testifiec
that his report of the interview with the prisoner, as published,
was an accurate statement of what occurred between him and the
prisoner, and he adopted it as his testimony, but was not willing-
to affirm that it was verbally accurate, or that it contained all that
the prisoner said. It accords with both English and American.
authorities in such cases to admit the testimony."
The true rule regarding the refreshing of a witness' memory is'
well stated in Union Bank v. Knapp, 3 Pickering (Mass.), 96. If
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the witness does actually recall the transactions through the aid
of the memoranda, he thereafter testifies to matters within his
knowledge, and the weight of his testimony is to be regarded inde-
pendently of the memoranda. These memoranda, therefore, may
as well be copies as originals, there being no especial importance
attaching to them other than their power to awaken the memory
,of the witness. Bullock v. Hunter, 44 Md., 416.
This is supported by the cases, which seem to indicate that the
-manner in which a witness shall be allowed to refresh his recol-
lection by reference to memoranda must be left to the trial court
to be determined with reference to the circumstances of the case
and the bearing of the witness. Johnson v. Coles, 21 Minn., loS.
In Madigan v. DeGraff, 17 Minn., 52, it is said, that allowing a
-witness to refresh his recollection by reference to a memoranda
is a question of a preliminary nature, addressed to the court, and
-where a witness has been allowed so to do, unless it clearly appears
that the Court has erred, a new trial will not be granted. In
addition, a great number of cases might be cited to the effect that
in refreshing his memory a witness need not be confined to origihal
records made by himself. A few, however, will be sufficien to
indicate the weight of authority.
Where a witness as to measurements testifies that the figures
used br him to refresh his memory were made at the time the
measurements were taken, and are correct, but that the paper on
-which they are written is a copy of the original, and that he has
lost the original, he may use the copy. Anderson v. linhoff, 34
Neb., 335. A witness may refresh his memory from a memoran-
.tum, known by him to be correct, which is made by another per-
son. Bowden v. Spellman, 59 Ark., 251. A writing used by a
witness to refresh his memory need not necessarily be an original
-writing, provided that, after inspecting it, the witness can speak of
the facts from his own recollection. Lainson v. Glass, 6 Colo., 134.
For the purpose of refreshing his memory, a witness may use a
copy of a copy without the production of the original. Wernmag
-v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 2o Mo. App., 473.
In i Greenleaf Evidence, 436-439, the rule is stated thus: "The
-witness need not have made the record himself; the essential thing
is that he should be able to guarantee that the record actually
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represented his recollection at the 
time, and this he may be able to
do, either by his general custom in 
making such records, or by his
assurance that he would not have 
made the record if he had not
believed it correct. The original 
record should be produced, not
a copy; nevertheless a copy may 
be used if the original is lost or
otherwise unavailable. So far as 
concerns stimulation by refer-
ence to a writing or the like, the 
fundamental notion is that any
paper may in the circumstances be 
properly used for the purpose.
The particular that the paper was 
not written by the witness him-
self is no objection. Furthermore 
it is not an objection that the
paper is a copy, and not an original, 
provided it does in fact serve
to revive the recollection. Accord: 
i Whart. Evidence, Par. 522;
Taylor on Evidence, pp. 1198 et seq.; 
3 Russell, Law of Crimes
(7 th Eng. Ed.), p. 2303.
It may be stated with certainty, then, 
that a witness may be
permitted to refresh his memory 
by reference to a printed copy of
a record made by himself, and if 
he is able thereafter to testify
to the facts as matter of present 
recollection, his testimony must
be admitted. From this it follows 
that the Supreme Court of
Nebraska was in agreement with 
the weight of authority in decid-
in, that the testimony of the witness 
in the principal case was
competent evidence.
